feat(security): security hardening, proxy support, and GL045 HTTP include warning
Security fixes: - Path traversal guard in include: local: — paths with ../ that escape the repo root are rejected instead of reading arbitrary host files - HTTP timeout (30 s) on all fetcher requests to prevent indefinite hangs - Response size cap (10 MiB) via io.LimitReader to prevent memory exhaustion - Cache directory and file permissions tightened to 0700/0600 - LSP Content-Length cap (64 MiB) to guard against DoS from a malicious client New feature: - --proxy flag on check, graph, and lsp subcommands; also proxy: key in .glint.yml; overrides system HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY env vars when set; cmdGraph and cmdLSP now also load .glint.yml for proxy/token/url fallbacks New lint rule: - GL045 (Warning): include: remote: using plain http:// instead of https:// Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -364,6 +364,20 @@ func TestServer_DidClose_ClearsdiAgnostics(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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func TestServer_ContentLengthTooLarge(t *testing.T) {
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// Craft a header with a content-length that exceeds the cap.
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// The server must reject it before allocating a giant buffer.
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header := fmt.Sprintf("Content-Length: %d\r\n\r\n", maxLSPMessageBytes+1)
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srv, _, _ := newTestServer([]byte(header))
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err := srv.Run()
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected error for oversized Content-Length, got nil")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "exceeds maximum") {
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t.Errorf("unexpected error: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestServer_UriToPath(t *testing.T) {
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tests := []struct {
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uri string
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